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Abstract 
Concern is growing throughout the United States about environmental 
and health risks associated with the use of agricultural chemicals. In 
response to these concerns, public policies designed to alter farming 
practices and the use of agricultural chemicals are being proposed and 
implemented. In addition, existing U.S. agricultural policies directed at 
price stabilization and income support are being reviewed for 
interdependencies with environmental measures. 
This paper provides a farm-level analysis of the interrelationships 
between the current U.S. commodity program for corn and selected 
environmentally motivated policies for controlling the use of corn 
rootworm insecticides. An integrated modeling system is employed that 
includes economic and biological components. The farm modeled is for 
Chickasaw County, Iowa. Results show that there are significant 
opportunities for coordinating agricultural commodity and environmental 
policies. Policy adjustments are identified that can reduce corn rootworm 
insecticide use, improving the quality of the environment and limiting 
health risk, while only modestly affecting certainly equivalent farm 
income. 
Introduction 
There is broad evidence of increased concern for environmental and 
health risks associated with the use of chemicals in U.S. agriculture 
(Batie 1987; Hoyer et al. 1987; O'Hare et al. 1985). Regulating powers of 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) are being extended 
through re-registration of pesticides, new drinking water standards, and 
other measures. Also, many states are enacting laws limiting the use of 
agricultural chemicals and/or providing funding for research on less 
chemically dependent cultivation practices, monitoring groundwater 
quality, and assessing health risks (Wise and Johnson 1989). In fact, it 
is somewhat surprising that the regulation of agricultural chemicals has 
progressed so far without more comprehensive analyses of the 
interrelationships between chemical use, agricultural commodity programs 
for price stabilization and income support, and farm-level decisions. In 
many cases it seems as if policies for regulation reflect a limited 
understanding of possible interdependencies (CARD and USEPA 1989). 
Empirical assessments have been developed for the farm-level impacts 
of U.S. agricultural commodity programs that extend the analysis of 
impacts to issues of uncertainty. Kramer and Pope (1981) have analyzed 
commodity program participation using a stochastic dominance model for 
Kern County (Calif.), demonstrating relationships among program 
parameters, risk attitudes, and farm size. Musser and Stamoulis (1981) 
have evaluated commodity programs from the 1977 U.S. Farm Bill using a 
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farm-level, quadratic risk programming model, concluding that for 
risk-averse Georgia farmers, commodity program participation dominated 
nonparticipation except at higher levels of expected net returns. An 
early study by Scott and Baker (1972) used quadratic programming to 
analyze risk-return trade-offs for Illinois farms, endogenizing commodity 
program participation. 
Recently, these farm-level studies have been expanded in scope, 
perhaps in response to concerns about environmental and commodity policy 
trade-offs. For example, Helms, Bailey, and Glover (1987) used a 
whole-farm simulation model to relate producer preferences on 
participation in commodity programs to the adoption of tillage practices. 
They found that a combination of commodity program participation with 
minimum and no-till practices dominated other alternatives for a typical 
Utah farm. In a study by McSweeny and Kramer (1986), the integration of 
commodity program participation and adoption of soil conservation 
practices within a risk framework was the focus. These authors also 
examined trade-offs between farm-level soil loss and nutrient (nitrogen 
and phosphorous) loss. Their findings suggested that cross-compliance 
between commodity and environmental programs would lead risk-averse 
southern Virginia farmers to adopt improved soil and nutrient loss control 
practices. 
The present study analyzes farm-level interrelationships between 
commodity programs and selected environmentally motivated policies for 
limiting the use of corn rootworm insecticides. A specialized version of 
an integrated modeling system that incorporates economic decision models 
and biogeophysical process models was employed for this application (CARD 
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and USEPA 1989). The study addresses the issue of rootworm, the most 
important corn insect pest in the Midwest (Foster et al. 1986). In crop 
rotations with one or more years of corn following corn, rootworm 
infestation often is a problem that requires insecticides or other forms 
of control. The hypothesis here is that current U.S. commodity programs 
provide incentives for producers to employ continuous corn rotations and 
these insecticides; changes in the commodity program could lead to farmer 
behavior that would reduce environmental and health risk without causing 
significant losses in certainty equivalent income. 
The Integrated Modeling System 
The integrated modeling system applied was the Comprehensive Economic 
Environmental Policy Evaluation System (CEEPES 1989), developed by the 
Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) and USEPA. A unique 
feature of CEEPES is the use of biological, geophysical, and phenological 
process models as a system, which is further integrated with economic 
decision and policy models. For the corn rootworm/U.S. commodity program 
analysis, this system was specialized for farm-level decisions. The 
specialized version of CEEPES is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Policy Component 
The policy component identified the agricultural and environmental 
policy instruments and summarized outcomes of key performance variables. 
The focus was on the interdependencies between the current U.S. commodity 
program for corn, set forth in the Food Security Act of 1985 (FSA85), and 
alternative policies for more directly regulating the use of corn rootworm 
Figure 1. Schematic of the Specialized Version of CEEPES 
Policy Component 
Price and income : Environmental 
stab if i zation: I 
' U.S. commodity program • Regulating corn rootworm 
for corn (target price, :insecticides (ban, 
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empirical distribution of rates, paid land diversion, ' 
' corn rootworm infestation base acres, etc.) ' 
' levels. 
' 
Incentives 
Restrictive Regulations ~'"''""''" Farm-Level Decision Component 
Bilogical Component 
Stochastic Optimization Model: Risk attitude, land 
The Crop Growth Quadratic Risk Programming. endowment, labor, and 
/ Model of EPIC Farmer's welfare, optimal machinery constraint, Simulated yields cropping patterns, insecticide market prices. for various crop use, enrollment in the commodity rotations under program for corn. various corn 
Historical weather rootworm 
patterns, crop infestation levels. 
rotations, tillage 
and soil parameters. 
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insecticides. The policy component provided incentives and restrictions 
to the farm-level decision component. Under the FSA85, price and income 
support and stabilization for corn producers is provided through 
nonrecourse loans, deficiency payments, paid land diversions, and reduced 
acreage provisions (Glaser 1986). These program parameters are set by the 
government prior to planting. Base acreage eligible for enrollment in the 
program is determined for each farm as a five-year moving average of acres 
planted plus those set aside under the program for corn. Given this rule, 
a reduction in the number of corn acres planted plus set aside in one year 
can reduce the base acres in the following year by one fifth. The base 
yield, which figures in the calculation of deficiency payments, was frozen 
in the FSA85, but for this analysis it too is assumed to be determined (as 
prior to 1986) by a five-year moving average. 
Three environmentally motivated policies for limiting the use of corn 
rootworm insecticides were examined. The first was a complete ban. The 
second was a tax on the use (purchase) of corn rootworm insecticides 
levied on the producer. The third maintained base acres if the current 
level of planted plus idled acres was lower than the base. This third 
policy--similar to a number of "flexible base" proposals being advanced 
for the 1990 farm bill--may reduce the acreage planted to corn following 
corn, thus decreasing the level of insecticide use. A more detailed 
discussion of impacts of combining the commodity and environmental 
policies is provided later. The emphasis in the analysis was on the 
interdependencies between commodity and environmental policies, as well as 
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opportunities for win-win or near win-win outcomes from more coordinated 
policy actions. 
Biological Component 
The biological component utilized an existing physiological process 
model, the Erosion Productivity Impact Calculator (EPIC). EPIC is capable 
of simulating growth and yield for both annual and perennial plants. EPIC 
can be operated in time steps by Julian day over an arbitrary number of 
years, permitting simulation of crop rotations. This feature of EPIC was 
important for the present analysis in that crop rotations are a way of 
controlling corn rootworm infestation. EPIC was designed so that required 
input data (weather, crop, tillage, and soil parameters) are realistically 
available to most model users. Documentation of EPIC is available in 
Williams, Jones, and Dyke (1984) and Putman and Dyke (1987). 
For operating and calibrating EPIC, we utilized historical weather 
data and actual yield data. Yields were simulated for commonly observed 
crop rotations. To account for corn yield reductions due to corn rootworm 
infestation, EPIC was modified to reflect root damage. The ranges and 
probabilities of damage were determined from experimental data and 
consultation with entomology specialists at Iowa State University 
(Tollefson 1989). Thus, the biological component was used to provide 
simulated yield distributions for selected rotations and levels of corn 
rootworm infestation. These yield distributions and infestation levels 
were in turn used to calculate distributions of net returns for the 
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cropping activities in the farm-level decision component. Thirty-three 
years of actual weather data were used to estimate these distributions. 
Farm-Level Decision Component 
The farm-level decision component utilized quadratic risk programming 
CQRP) to evaluate producer behavior under uncertainty. Among the 
alternative methods for explicitly modeling risk in farm decision 
problems, QRP (the mean-variance approach) probably has been the most 
popular. Freund (1956) was the first to apply QRP for an agricultural 
firm. Since then, QRP has been applied in many farm-level decision 
analyses; e.g., Scott and Baker (1972), Jensen and Piedrahita (1979), 
Musser and Stamoulis (1981), and McSweeny and Kramer (1986). 
In matrix notation the standard QRP model can be represented as 
MAX(fT~ - ~Tr~} ' 
X 
subject to A X s £, 
X~ 0, 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
where X is the vector of enterprise activity levels; f is the vector of 
expected net returns; r is the variance covariance matrix of net returns; 
a is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion; £ is a vector of the 
resource endowments; and A is the matrix of input-output coefficients. It 
is well known that the quadratic objective function is compatible with the 
widely accepted expected utility theory only if the farmer's utility 
function is quadratic, or if the farmer has a negative exponential utility 
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function and the probability distribution of the net returns for the 
activities is multivariate normal (Freund 1956). However, the studies of 
Tsiang (1972), Levy and Markowitz (1979), and Meyer (1987) suggest that 
the mean-variance approach may closely approximate economic behavior based 
on a wider range of utility functions. 
The QRP model activities were developed for production, enrollment in 
the government program for corn, penalty for loss of corn base, and 
insecticide supply. The production activities were for selected 
rotations, a single soil type, and a conventional tillage method. 
Enrollment activities were for several commonly observed crop sequences. 
Set-aside requirements, deficiency payments, the nonrecourse loan program, 
and paid land diversion were included in the simulations. The penalty on 
loss of corn base activities was specified for several crop sequences. 
The insecticide supply activity was specified for a standard rootworm 
insecticide application. The representative farm was endowed with 350 
acres of land and subjected to seasonal limits on labor and 
machinery. 
Representative Farm 
The specialized version of CEEPES was applied for a typical farm in 
Nashua, Iowa (Chickasaw County). Crops included in the farm-level 
analysis were corn (C), soybeans (S), oats (0), and legume hay (L), grown 
in typical rotations observed in Iowa. Five crop rotations were included 
in the representative farm model: (1) continuous corn (CC); (2) corn 
following soybeans (CS); (3) two years of corn following one year of 
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soybeans (CCS); (4) a sequence of corn, soybeans, corn, oats, legume hay 
(CSCOL); and (5) corn followed by oats, followed by three years of legume 
hay (COLLL). 
Rotations with one or more years of corn following corn were assumed 
to be subject to rootworm infestation in the absence of corn rootworm 
insecticides. Following Foster et al. (1986) and consultation with an ISU 
entomologist (Tollefson 1989), it was determined that corn root damage 
could be assumed negligible in all crop sequences other than corn 
following corn (i.e., the CC and CCS rotations). The sources of risks 
considered were technical risk in yields due to weather and pest 
infestation, as well as output price risk. These sources of risk were 
important for conditioning producer decision making in the representative 
farm model. 
Model Specification, Data, and Assumptions 
CEEPES was adapted to the production area in Iowa selected for use in 
illustrating farm-level trade-offs between environmental and agricultural 
commodity policies. In this section the process models utilized for the 
analysis are reviewed and the structure required for the policy evaluation 
exercises is developed. 
EPIC 
EPIC was calibrated to reflect yield levels in the study area and to 
simulate impacts of corn rootworm infestation. Historical daily weather 
data for the years 1955-1987 was used, coupled with plot-level 
experimental data on rootworm infestations and outcomes on corn yield for 
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the years 1977-1984 in Nashua (Tollefson 1989). Average county soybean, 
oat, and legume hay yields for years 1977-1987 were used to calibrate EPIC 
(Iowa Agricultural Statistics 1978-1988). To assess impacts of rootworms 
on corn yields, EPIC was applied to estimate yield reductions for selected 
levels of damage. The rootworm damages were reflected in reduced daily 
water uptake. This approximation of damages was based on results of an 
EPA-funded study on corn rootworm insecticides (CARD and USEPA 1989). 
Four levels of rootworm infestation were selected using the ISU 
root-rating system. Following Tollefson (1989), ranges of root damage 
with ratings 1-3, 3-4, 4-5, and 5-6 were mapped into four infestation 
levels (None, Low, Moderate, Heavy), with probabilities 0.1, 0.4, 0.4, 
and 0.1, respectively. The estimation of the discrete probability 
distribution for infestation levels was based on Turpin et al. (1972), 
as well as on experimental data from Nashua on observed infestations and 
yield reductions under various infestations (Tollefson 1989). This 
experimental data also was used to calibrate EPIC and to simulate corn 
yields for 33 years using the probabilities of infestation. It was 
assumed that the infestation levels were temporally uncorrelated and 
independent of weather. 
QRP 
Historical market prices for each crop year (1955-1987) were obtained 
from an Iowa State University Extension publication (Futrell 1988). 
Relevant corn program parameters for the period 1974-1987 were obtained 
from unpublished ASCS data (1989). Data on variable production costs for 
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the crop sequences were extracted from ISU Extension budgets (Duffy 1987). 
All prices and costs were expressed in 1987 dollars. 
Corn rootworm insecticide costs were not directly included in the net 
returns for the production activities. Instead, the cost of the 
insecticide was introduced through a separate activity to facilitate the 
introduction of the ban and tax. Accounting for the quantity of the 
chemical applied was in pounds of active ingredients per acre. The 
recommended rate used was one pound per acre. Insecticide costs per acre 
were calculated using the price of Counter, the major corn rootworm 
insecticide in Iowa (Wintersteen and Hartzler 1987). 
Production Activities 
The time series of yields estimated from EPIC, together with the 
historical market prices, program parameters, and variable costs of 
production, were integrated to estimate net returns per acre by production 
activity and alternative infestation levels. Recall that only corn 
following corn rotations were subject to rootworm damage. That is, the 
estimates of net returns were 
5 
RP .. = l: W .k[YLD .. k * MP 'k - VC,J.k], 
1] k=l J 1] ~ ~ 
(4) 
where RP .. is the net returns to production activity j in year i (dollars 
1] 
per acre); Wjk is the relative share of crop k in rotation j 
5 
(l:W.k=l); 
k=l J 
YLD .. k is the yield for crop kin rotation j in year i (bushels per acre); 
1] 
MPik is the market price of crop kin year i (dollars per bushel) ; VC .. k 
1] 
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is the variable costs of crop k in rotation j in year i (dollars per 
acre). The expected net returns for each of the production activities 
were approximated by taking the average over the 33 years. 
Enrollment and Penalty Activities 
Activities to simulate enrollment in the commodity program for corn 
and the loss of corn base acres were specified. Penalty activities were 
forced into the solution only when the level of corn acreage fell below 
that required to maintain the existing corn base. Both the enrollment and 
penalty activities were defined for these crop sequences: (1) corn 
following corn, (2) corn following soybeans, and (3) corn following legume 
hay. 
Since farmers have knowledge of government program parameters prior 
to planting, the variability of net returns to enrollment derives from 
uncertainty about market prices and yields. Although expectations of 
market prices in a given year are likely conditioned upon the level of the 
program parameters, estimation of this relationship is beyond the scope of 
this farm-level analysis. A procedure similar to McSweeny and Kramer 
(1986) was followed. Specifically, the variability of net returns to 
enrollment, with program parameters certain, was approximated using the 
target price, loan rates, and paid land diversion payment rate for a 
single year (1987). These parameters were deflated and used in the 
calculation of net returns to enrollment for each year from 1974 to 1987. 
Acreage reduction rates were also as in 1987, For the returns to the 
enrollment activities, it was assumed that participating producers would 
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take advantage of not only the deficiency payments but also the 
nonrecourse loan and the paid land diversion program. 
RE .. l.J 
The net returns of the enrollment activities were calculated as 
+ ((1- ARP- PLD) * [MAX(TGT. - MAX(SAP., NLR.), 0)] * BYLDJ..J.} J. J. J. 
+ (PLD * PLDP. * BYLD .. ) - CVC. , 
1 1J 1 
(5) 
where RE .. is the return to participating in the corn program of sequence 
1J 
j in year i (dollars per acre of base); ARP is the 1987 set-aside required 
under the acreage reduction program (percent of total acres enrolled); PLD 
is the 1987 set-aside required under the voluntary paid land diversion 
program (percent of total acres enrolled) ; LLR. is the 1987 local 
1 
Chickasaw county loan rate for corn inflated to year i (dollars per 
bushel); MPC. is the real local market price for corn in year i (dollars 
1 
per bushel); TGT. is the 1987 target price for corn inflated to year i 
1 
(dollars per bushel); SAP. is the real national season average market 
1 
price used to determine the deficiency payments in year i (dollars per 
bushel) ; NLR. is the 1987 national average loan rate for corn inflated to 
1 
year i (dollars per bushel); BYLD .. is the base yield established by the 
1J 
producer in year i for crop sequence j (bushels per acre); PLDP. is the 
1 
1987 paid land diversion payment rate inflated to year i (dollars per 
bushel); and CVC. is the real cost in year i of covering acres set-aside 
1 
under the acreage reduction and paid land diversion programs (dollars per 
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acre). The expected net returns to the enrollment activities were 
approximated by the average of all years. 
Estimating the distributions of net returns for the penalty 
activities required the evaluation of the variability of future losses 
from base acre reduction. Producers are faced with uncertainty about 
which programs will be implemented and what the values of the associated 
parameters will be in future years. To approximate the variability in the 
net present value of the stream of future losses, both sources of 
uncertainty should be considered. In practice, however, it is difficult 
to predict if government commodity programs will change in future years. 
Thus, the latter was estimated using the actual parameter values for the 
time period 1974-1987. 
The annual return to an acre of established corn base was estimated 
as the return to an acre of corn in the program less the best nonprogram 
alternative: 
BR .. = [(1- ARP. - PLD.) * YLD .. * MAX(MPe., LLR.)] 
~J ~ ~ ~J ~ ~ 
(6) 
+ (PLD. * PLOP. * BYLD .. ) - eve. - NBA., 
~ ~ ~J ~ ~ 
where BR .. is the return to an acre of corn base above that of the best 
~J 
nonprogram alternative for sequence j in year i (dollars per acre); and 
NBA. is the return to the best nonprogram crop alternative in year i 
~ 
(dollars per acre). The net returns (costs) of the penalty activities 
were. calculated for each year as the net present value of the BR .. over a 
~J 
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five-year period. The expected net returns of the penalty activities were 
approxL~ted as the average over all years. 
Constraints 
Machinery and labor requirements were subdivided into four seasons--
April and May, June and July, August and September, and October and 
November--and were obtained from CARD/SCS budgets. Estimates of machinery 
and labor availability were based on typical numbers of workers and 
machines on a representative Iowa farm, and average number of working 
hours per season. Constraints on the level of corn base eligible for 
participation in the farm program were dependent upon the assumed 
percentage of total acres established as base. A constraint on the amount 
of rootworm insecticide was also included to simulate the insecticide ban. 
Balance and transfer rows made up the remainder of the QRP model. 
Variance-Covariance Matrix 
Using a third-degree polynomial, net returns were regressed on time 
to detrend the series for each of the three types of activities: 
production, enrollment and penalty. These detrend net returns were used 
to estimate the variance-covariance matrix. Thus, it was implicitly 
assumed that farmers generally are aware of long-run trends in net 
returns, and only the deviations from the long-run trend are considered 
random or unpredictable. The calculated variance-covariance matrix and 
the expected net returns for the production activities and selected 
enrollment and penalty activities are presented in Table 1. 
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Table l. Variance-a:lvar: mtrix ani ~ ret returns for tha basel.:ke 
Activity 
Activity 
NutDer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Variaoce-covaria 
a:: a:: a::s a::s cs CSQ)L CDUL m::GAAM m::GAAM PENALlY PENALlY 
N:l rnF rnF N:l rnF rnF GELS CELC GELS CELC 
N:l rnF N:l rnF 
1 m2 
2 8281 12154 
3 6433 6744 5929 
4 6317 7730 5829 6137 
5 5895 6119 5749 5653 5811 
6 3665 3492 3519 3372 3547 2396 
7 1031 588 1262 1171 1422 1304 1530 
8 -1675 -2036 -1011 -1078 -700 -446 -17 1481 
9 -1681 -2039 -1014 -1080 -701 -448 -19 1486 1491 
10 -195 -42 -199 -194 -288 -216 -220 59 59 155 
11 -265 -284 -239 -272 -285 -208 -169 118 118 100 75 
E><pect:ed Returns ($/Acre) 
250.48 179.69 246.51 227.12 234.71 179.12 169.54 153.10 152.94 -76.68 -45.09 
rnF = Subject to insect infestaticn c =Com 0 =Oats 
EL = Folla.ring s = Soyteans L = LeguJE hay 
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Several observations can be made based on Table 1. The rotations CC 
and CCS with insecticide applications dominate the same rotations without 
insecticides. Accounting for insecticide costs ($8.00/acre for CC and 
$2.33/acre for CCS), the expected net returns of CC and CCS with 
insecticides are higher by 35 percent and 7 percent, respectively, than 
those without insecticides. Moreover, the variances of net returns for 
these rotations with insecticides are lower by 36 percent and 3 percent, 
respectively, than those without insecticides. Consequently, CC and CCS 
without insecticides are expected to be in the optimal QRP solution only 
if their insecticide-using counterparts are constrained or somehow made 
less profitable. 
Net returns of the production and participation activities are 
negatively correlated (Table 1). In general, the higher the share of corn 
in the rotation, the more negative the correlation. Also, the variances 
of the enrollment activities generally are substantially lower than those 
of the production activities. These relationships suggest that enrollment 
in the government program for corn, in combination with the production 
activities, leads to a reduction in risk. 
The penalty activities are negatively correlated with the production 
activities and positively correlated with the enrollment activities. This 
implies that higher returns to enrollment in the corn program are 
associated with higher opportunity costs for loss of base acres. The 
covariances among the production activities, which all include corn and 
are subject to the same weather conditions, are always positive. The 
rotations including legume hay have relatively small covariances with the 
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other rotations. They also have the lowest variances, which tends to 
increase their attractiveness as the level of risk aversion 
increases. 
Empirical Findings and Policy Implications 
The standard for comparison in this analysis is a "baseline" defined 
to reflect existing agricultural and environmental policies. In the 
baseline, the target price was set at the 1987 level of $3.03 per bushel, 
while the acreage reduction rates CARP) and the paid land diversion (PLD) 
were set at 20 percent and 10 percent, respectively. Also, 65 percent of 
the 350 total representative farm acres (228 acres), were assumed eligible 
for enrollment in the corn program. The cost of corn rootworm insecticide 
was eight dollars per pound of active ingredient. 
Recall that three policies for limiting the use of corn rootworm 
insecticides were analyzed and compared: a complete ban, a tax on the 
purchase of insecticides, and the "flexible base." To investigate the 
role of risk aversion in the empirical analysis, nine levels of the 
Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion coefficient, a, were simulated, ranging 
l 
from a = 0.0000 (risk-neutral) to a = 0.0004. Sensitivity analyses were 
performed for the target price, the ARP set-aside rate, and the corn base 
acreage. Additional sensitivity analysis involving the target price and 
ARP set-aside rate provided an opportunity to investigate the possibility 
of compensating producers for the insecticide ban by offering additional 
program benefits. 
The baseline QRP was solved initially, with the penalty for loss of 
corn base imposed, for each of the nine levels of risk aversion. The model 
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then was solved at each level of risk aversion incorporating the rootworm 
insecticide ban and the two levels of insecticide taxes (27 solutions). 
Following these computations, the penalty on loss of corn base was removed 
and each of the above alternatives was repeated (36 solutions). The 
sensitivity analyses performed on the baseline involved two alternative 
levels of corn base, and one lower level of target price and ARP set-aside 
rate. Solutions for all levels of risk aversion with and without the 
penalty on loss of base acres were obtained for each alternative (72 
solutions). The same analysis was subsequently performed on the 
insecticide ban (72 solutions). Finally, the additional sensitivity 
analysis on the target price and ARP acreage reduction rate was performed 
for 11 levels of target price and 9 levels of the ARP rate. Solutions 
were obtained for the baseline and the ban, with and without the penalty 
imposed at one level of risk aversion (80 solutions). Altogether, the QRP 
was solved 296 times. 
Insecticide Ban 
The policy of a complete ban on insecticides had the most notable 
producer impacts. It is apparent from Figure 2a that the E-V frontiers 
for the ban are above the frontiers for the baseline, with and without the 
penalty. This result holds for all levels of expected returns and widens 
as the risk aversion coefficient, a, increases. In other words, a 
complete ban on rootworm insecticide application would reduce 
substantially the expected utility of the farmer. 
Figure 2a. Comparison of E-V Frontiers lor 
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Figure 2b. Comparison of E-V Frontiers for 
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Figure 2d. Comparison of E-V Frontiers for 
lower ARP Set-Aside and Ban 
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Table 2 presents percentage changes in the optimal values of the 
objective function when a ban on rootworm is imposed. Clearly, the 
negative impact of the ban on expected utility increases with the risk 
aversion coefficient. For the baseline, compared to the ban, reductions 
of 2.3 percent and 2.8 percent for a risk-neutral farmer (a = 0.0) under 
no-penalty and penalty, respectively, were much smaller (in absolute 
terms) than the 16.7 percent and 21.7 percent reductions for a risk-averse 
farmer (a= 0.0004). Thus, for the representative farm, the impacts of 
the complete ban on expected utility varied significantly depending on 
attitudes toward risk. 
Table 3 demonstrates that for a = 0.0002, the acres of corn grown and 
the acres enrolled in the program decreased (except when the corn base was 
50 percent of the total acres) with the insecticide ban. At the same 
time, the summed acres of all other crops (soybeans, oats, and legume hay) 
increased. These results held whether the penalty for loss of base acres 
was imposed or not. The observed shifts in crop selection were as 
expected, since the elimination of the CC and CCS rotations with 
insecticides made corn relatively less attractive. 
Interdependencies between impacts of the complete ban and major 
parameters of the commodity program for corn can be analyzed (Tables 2 and 
3 and Figs. 2a-2d). The greater the opportunity to take advantage of the 
commodity program (a larger established base), the greater the benefit of 
participating (a higher target price); the lower the costs of 
participating (a lower ARP set-aside), the greater the adverse impact of 
the insecticide ban on farmer expected utility (Table 2). 
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Table 2. Percentage change in objective function values when a ban on 
rootworm insecticides is imposed 
Alternative 
Baseline 
Corn Base = 65% of Total 
Acres 
No Penalty Imposed 
Penalty Imposed 
Scenarios 
Corn Base = 50% of Total 
Acres 
No Penalty Imposed 
Penalty Imposed 
Corn Base = 80% of Total 
Acres 
No Penalty Imposed 
Penalty Imposed 
Target Price = $2.50/ 
bushel 
No Penalty Imposed 
Penalty Imposed 
ARP Set-aside = 10% 
No Penalty Imposed 
Penalty Imposed 
No Program 
No Penalty Imposed 
0 0.0001 
-2.3 -6.4 
-2.8 -9.3 
-0.2 -3.8 
-0.2 -3.8 
-3.0 -10.2 
-7.0 -12.9 
-1.2 -4.9 
-2.7 -8.0 
-2.1 -7.3 
-4.5 -10.4 
0.0 -3.2 
Level of a 
0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 
-ll.8 -14.3 -16.7 
-15 .1 -19.5 -21.7 
-6.3 -10.7 -14.7 
-6.3 -ll.8 -16.3 
-12.8 -14.3 -16.7 
-20.0 -21.2 -22.9 
-5 .1 -6.2 -7.8 
-9.9 -10.6 -13.1 
-13.1 -15. 1 -17.2 
-16.3 -19.9 -22.0 
-2.6 -2.4 -2.5 
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Table 3. Levels of selected indicator variables, for a = 0.0002 
Total of Enrollment l 
Corn Other Crops In Corn Insecticide 
Alternative Grown Grown Program Applied, 
(acres) (acres) (acres) (pounds ) 
Baseline 
Corn Base = 65% of Total 
Acres 
3 No Penalty/CPU 148 122 228 118 
Penalty/CPU 148 122 228 118 
No Penalty/Ban 121 164 185 0 
Penalty/Ban 136 140 209 0 
Scenarios 
Corn Base = 50% of Total 
Acres 
No Penalty/CPU 114 174 175 65 
Penalty/CPU 114 174 175 65 
No Penalty/Ban 114 174 175 0 
Penalty/Ban 114 174 175 0 
Corn Base = 80% of Total 
Acres 
No Penalty/CPU 176 80 270 156 
Penalty/CPU 182 70 280 164 
No Penalty/Ban 121 163 186 0 
Penalty/Ban 135 141 208 0 
Target Price = $2.50 
No Penalty/CPU 121 163 187 70 
Penalty/CPU 148 122 228 118 
No Penalty/Ban 100 196 153 0 
Penalty/Ban 116 172 178 0 
ARP = 10% 
No Penalty/CPU 171 122 228 140 
Penalty/CPU 171 122 228 140 
No Penalty/Ban 132 146 175 0 
Penalty/Ban 146 123 194 0 
No Program 
No Penalty/CPU 116 234 0 35 
No Penalty/Ban 105 245 0 0 
50% Tax 
No Penalty/CPU 148 122 228 118 
Penalty/CPU 148 122 228 118 
100% Tax 
No Penalty/CPU 148 122 228 118 
Penalty/CPU 148 122 228 118 
1 Area reported includes planted plus area set aside under ARP and PLD. 
:Quantity reported is in pounds of active ingredient. 
CPU = Other parameters unchanged. 
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The role of eligible acres for enrollment in the corn program is 
easily demonstrated by an example. For a = 0.0002, the impact on 
certainty equivalent farm income varied from 6.3 percent when 50 percent 
of the total acres were eligible for enrollment, in both the penalty and 
no penalty alternatives, to 12.8 percent and 20 percent in the no penalty 
and penalty alternatives for the 80 percent corn base, respectively. 
Comparison of Figures 2a and 2b demonstrates that the higher the base 
acres as a share of total acres, the greater the impact of the insecticide 
ban on expected utility. The farmers with a higher share of base acres 
were penalized most, especially when the penalty was imposed. For 
a= 0.0002, with and without penalty imposed, the larger the percentage of 
base to total acres, the greater the reduction in corn acres grown and 
corn acres enrolled in the program after the insecticide ban (Table 3). 
The converse is true for the acreages of other crops. 
The relationship of the target price to the ban and the expected 
utility of farmers can be demonstrated by comparing the impact of the ban 
on the latter for the baseline target price ($3.03) and the lower target 
price alternative ($2.50) (Table 2). For a= 0.0002, the 5.1 percent (no 
penalty) and 9.9 percent (penalty) reductions in expected utility from.the 
ban under the lower target price, as compared to the no-ban situation, are 
significantly smaller than the 11.8 percent (no penalty) and 15.1 percent 
(penalty) reductions under the baseline target price. Comparison of 
Figures 2a and 2c demonstrates that the adverse impact of the insecticide 
ban on expected utility of the producer clearly decreased with the lower 
target price. A similar comparison can be made between the baseline 
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results and the lower ARP rate. The adverse impact of the ban on expected 
utility increases only slightly as the costs of enrolling in the program 
decrease via lower ARP requirements (Table 2 and Figs. 2a, 2d). 
The relationships between impacts of the rootworm insecticide ban and 
the levels of the target price and the ARP set-aside rate on the crop mix 
can be deduced from Table 3. The lower target price increases the impact 
of the ban on the area of corn and other crops grown and the amount of 
corn enrolled in the program when the penalty was imposed. For the lower 
target price, there was a 22 percent reduction (from 148 acres to 116) in 
area planted to corn. At the baseline target price, there was an 8 
percent reduction (from 148 acres to 136) in the area planted to corn. 
When base flexibility was introduced, the lower target price had a minimal 
effect on the impact of the ban. The area of other crops grown increased 
more (less) under the ban with the lower target price when the penalty was 
imposed (not imposed) (Table 3). The lower ARP set-aside rate increased 
the impact of the ban on the area of corn grown as well as corn enrolled 
in the program regardless of whether the penalty was imposed or not 
(Table 3). 
Finally, for the elimination of the corn program, Table 3 shows that 
with the ban, the reduction in corn grown was 9 percent (from 116 acres to 
105). This can be compared to the baseline, where the ban resulted in an 
18 percent reduction (148 to 121) in corn acres. Clearly the impact of 
the ban on corn produced would be smaller if no program existed. 
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Likewise, the impact of the ban on the other crops grown would be 
substantially smaller if the program was eliminated. 
Flexible Base 
In the baseline of the representative farm model, the commodity 
program for corn increases corn production and the use of more rotations 
in which corn follows corn. Thus, greater amounts of insecticides are 
used to secure program benefits. If reductions in acres of corn grown did 
not result in base acre reductions, the incentive for rotations of corn 
following corn would diminish. In the model, this policy change is 
implemented by the removal of the penalty activities. This base 
flexibility can be viewed as an indirect environmental policy for 
regulating insecticide usage. 
From Table 3, observe that the flexible base policy had no impact on 
insecticide use under the 50 percent and 65 percent base acre 
alternatives, and only a moderate impact (5 percent reduction) when the 
farm was assumed to have an 80 percent corn base. That is, in the first 
two corn base alternatives, the assigned base acres are fully utilized in 
the optimal solution even without the penalty. For the 80 percent 
alternative, the base acreage available for participation was 3.7 percent 
greater than the optimal when no penalty was imposed (280 acres vs. 270). 
Thus, the elimination of the penalty for loss of base acres resulted in a 
reduction of corn grown and total insecticide use. The combined impact of 
flexible base and a lower target price on the total level of insecticide 
use was significant. Total insecticides applied declined nearly 
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41 percent (from ll8 lbs. to 70) when the baseline alternative was 
compared to the lower target price/no penalty alternative. 
In addition to the potential positive environmental impacts of the 
flexible base, the policy also relaxes a potentially significant 
constraint for producer behavior. Hence, increases in producer expected 
utility and adjustments in the crop mix are likely. The percentage 
changes in the optimal value of the objective function for flexible versus 
nonflexible base are summarized for the selected values of the program 
parameters (Table 4). Base flexibility always left unchanged or increased 
the objective function value. Generally, the negative impact of the 
penalty on the farmer's expected utility increased with the risk aversion 
coefficient. These results are illustrated in Figures 2a-2d, which show 
the E-V frontiers for the penalty situations overlay or are positioned 
above the frontiers for the no penalty (base flexibility) alternatives. 
The gaps between the E-V frontiers under the penalty and no penalty 
scenarios generally increased with the level of risk aversion. In 
addition, the gaps were larger under the ban than when no ban was imposed. 
Table 4 and comparisons of Figures 2a and 2b also show that base 
flexibility increased producer expected utility more as the percent of. 
total acres eligible for participation increased, especially under the 
ban. The implication is that the removal of the penalty would be 
favorable to producers with relatively high levels of established base. 
When the ban is imposed, removal of the penalty has no additional impact 
on the use of rootworm insecticides. However, base flexibility does have 
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Table 4, Percentage change in objective function value given removal of 
the penalty 
Level of ct 
Alternative 0 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 
Baseline 
Corn Base 65% of Total 
Acres 
No Ban 0.0 0.0 0.0 o.o 1.2 
Ban 0.5 0.0 4.0 6.6 7.7 
Scenarios 
Corn Base = 50% of Total 
Acres 
No Ban 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Ban 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 1.9 
Corn Base = 80% of Total 
Acres 
No Ban 0.8 0.0 0.2 3.7 6.3 
Ban 5. 1 3. 1 9.2 12.8 14.8 
Target Price $2. 50/ 
bushel 
No Ban 0.0 0.0 2.0 5.0 8.0 
Ban 1.5 3.4 7.4 10.1 14.6 
ARP Set-aside = 10% 
No Ban 0.0 0.0 0.0 0. 1 1.9 
Ban 2.6 0.1 3.8 6. 1 8. 1 
50% Tax 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 
100% Tax 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.5 
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potential for compensating producers for the losses of welfare associated 
with a ban. 
When the target price was reduced to $2.50 per bushel, compared to 
the baseline of $3.03, the impact of the flexible base policy on expected 
utility increased (Table 4). A similar comparison between the baseline 
results and the lower ARP set-aside rate shows that the impact of 
flexibility was minimal. When the returns to the program were reduced by 
the lower target price, producers selected a lower level of corn 
production only if there was no penalty for loss of future eligibility in 
the corn program (Table 3). 
When no ban was imposed, the flexible base policy left unchanged or 
decreased the acreage of corn and enrollment in the government program, 
while increasing the acres of other crops when the ban was imposed. With 
the removal of the penalty, the percent reduction in corn acreage for the 
lower target price alternative was larger than that for the baseline. 
Likewise, the impact of the flexibility on the acreages of other crops and 
corn enrolled was greater with the lower target price. Base flexibility 
under the lower ARP set-aside rate had no impact on planted acreages when 
no ban was imposed. 
The impact of flexibility on the optimal crop mix was greatest under 
the insecticide ban. With the ban, under baseline conditions, the 
flexible base policy resulted in 11 percent fewer acres (136 to 121) of 
corn and about the same level of reduction in corn enrolled in the 
program. This is compared to no reduction when the ban was not imposed. 
A similar result held for each of the other alternatives, providing 
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support for the argument that current rules for base acres dampen the 
degree to which producers will respond to a ban by changing cropping 
patterns. 
Taxing Insecticides 
Two scenarios were evaluated--one a SO percent tax and the other a 
100 percent tax. It was found that the tax at either level was an 
ineffective policy instrument for reducing the use of insecticides. For 
a= 0.0002, there was simply no change in the use of rootworm insecticides 
in response to the tax (Table 3). A comparison of E-V frontiers for the 
baseline and the 100 percent insecticide tax (Fig. 3) shows that the 
impact of the 100 percent tax on the level of expected returns and the 
variability of returns was relatively small for all levels of risk 
aversion. In addition, neither tax had an effect on the impact of the 
implementation of the flexible base on expected utility (Table 4) . Taxes 
at these levels will not alter producer behavior or use of insecticides. 
The taxes simply reduced the farmers' expected utility. Thus, the tax may 
be viewed as a simple transfer of income. 
Additional Observations on the Role of the Corn Program 
The empirical results demonstrate that when no ban was imposed, the 
amount of insecticide application followed closely the amount of corn 
acreage (Table 3). As the returns to the program enrollment increased and 
more corn was grown, more rotations with corn following corn were employed 
(CC and CCS). For the baseline, the amount of rootworm insecticide 
applied (with the penalty included) was the same as the amount applied 
with the lower target price (118 pounds). It was 16 percent lower than 
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Figure 3. Comparison of E-V Frontiers for 
Baseline and the 100 Percent 
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the amount applied with the lower ARP set-aside rate (140 pounds). One of 
the most notable results derives from comparison between the amount of 
insecticide applied when the program was eliminated and the other 
alternatives. The reduction from the baseline to the no-program option 
was over 70 percent (118 to 35 pounds) (Table 3). This strongly supports 
the argument that the government corn program encourages continuous 
cropping and use of rootworm insecticides. 
The higher the level of base acres, the larger were the quantities of 
insecticides applied. With 50, 65, and 80 percent of total acres in the 
corn base, 65, 118, and 164 pounds of active ingredient were applied, 
respectively, when the penalty was imposed. These fluctuations in the 
quantities of insecticides applied were associated with changes in acres 
treated at a constant rate. Changes in the per acre rates were not 
investigated. 
As the target price was lowered, area planted to corn decreased 
(Table 3). The opposite was the case for the lower ARP set-aside. When 
the commodity program was eliminated altogether, the total of corn acreage 
decreased further and the area planted to other crops increased. The 
decrease in the area of corn grown from the baseline (148 acres) to the 
no-program option (116 acres) was 22 percent. These results demonstrate 
the strong impact of the commodity program on producer behavior. 
At all levels of risk aversion, the impact of the insecticide ban on 
farm income was significantly smaller with no program (Table 2). Figure 4 
demonstrates the dramatic impact of the corn program on expected returns 
and the variability of returns. The variability of returns under the 
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program was much lower than without the program. Similar to that reported 
by Musser and Stamoulis (1981), program participation dominated 
nonparticipation. 
It can be seen that producer expected utility increased at a faster 
rate with the target price when no ban was imposed (Fig. 5). The ban on 
insecticides restricted producer ability to take advantage of the higher 
program payments. At low levels of the target price, the reduction in 
income caused by a penalty was relatively larger. In fact, the penalty 
caused a greater reduction in producer expected utility than the ban at 
the lowest levels of target prices considered ($2.00 and $2.20). This 
result was expected in that when benefits to the program were low, there 
was incentive to reduce corn acreage, whereby the penalty was invoked. As 
the target price increased, the adverse impact of the ban on producer 
welfare dominated that of the penalty. 
The idea of compensating the producer for an insecticide ban by 
altering program parameters is intriguing. Observe that, to maintain the 
same level of expected utility with the ban as achieved under the 
baseline, a target price of approximately $3.50 (with the penalty) could 
be offered to producers (Fig. 5). A smaller target price of approximately 
$3.45 would achieve the same result if the flexible base policy were to be 
introduced. 
The reduction in producer welfare as the ARP set-aside rate 
increased was greater for the no-ban situation (with and without base 
flexibility) than for the ban (Fig. 6). Thus, we can conclude that as the 
set-aside rate decreased, thereby decreasing the costs of participation, 
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Figure 5. Objective Function Values For 
Baseline and Ban at Alternative 
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the producer was again better able to capture the higher returns of the 
program when no ban was imposed. There was no level of ARP set-aside that 
would compensate the producers for an insecticide ban. 
Conclusions 
This analysis of the implications of organizing commodity and 
environmental policies in a more coordinated fashion has shown a number of 
opportunities for improvement. Under certain conditions, the absence of 
base flexibility for corn was a primary factor driving the use of 
continuous corn rotations and corn rootworm insecticides. Generally, 
changes in commodity program parameters that increased the opportunity 
cost of losing the base resulted in the increased use of corn following 
corn rotations and corn rootworm insecticides. These increases in the 
opportunity cost of losing the base involved higher target prices, lower 
ARP set-aside rates, and a higher ratio of base to total farm acreage. 
An additional aspect of the results illustrates the importance of 
risk aversion in guiding farm-level decisions on insecticide use and 
cropping patterns. These behavioral parameters were highly tied to 
commodity program provisions. That is, with increased risk aversion, 
farmers were inclined to participate in the stabilizing commodity 
programs. This participation and maintenance of base acreage resulted in 
corn-after-corn rotations and use of corn rootworm insecticides. 
Alternative ways of achieving income stability are possible through the 
purchase and sale of options, increases in diversification, and 
alternative financial instruments for cushioning uncertainty; e.g., crop 
insurance. 
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One of the alternatives investigated in detail was base flexibility. 
This idea is consistent with a number of proposals for the 1990 farm bill. 
In general, the conclusion from these exercises was that introduction of a 
flexible base would, under certain conditions, reduce the use of corn 
rootworm insecticides. The results suggested that increased flexibility 
might be tied with a ban or partial ban on the use of corn rootworm 
insecticide as a way of compensating farmers for associated income losses. 
Also the target price could be increased to compensate farmers for an 
insecticide ban. A higher target price with a more flexible base can be 
viewed as a premium paid to farmers for the ban. By comparing certainty 
equivalent incomes, a value of the target price that would leave the 
farmers equally well off could be directly determined. 
Clearly, there are significant opportunities for better coordinating 
environmental and agricultural policies. In fact, for corn rootworm 
insecticides, agricultural commodity programs have perverse environmental 
impacts. Our results show that a certainty equivalent income can be 
maintained while significantly reducing chemical use by modest changes in 
current commodity programs. Results from these farm-level analyses 
indicate opportunities for improving the effectiveness of agricultural 
commodity and environmental policies through coordination. 
i 1 
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Endnotes 
1. Iowa State University has developed a scale rating root damage 
from one to six for larval feeding. The rating scale is defined as 
follows: 1, when no damage or only a few minor feeding scars are evident; 
2, when feeding scars are evident but no roots have been eaten to within 1 
1/2 inches of the plant; 3, when several roots have been eaten to within 
1 1/2 inches of the plant but the equivalent of an entire node of roots 
has not been destroyed; 4, when one node of roots has been completely 
destroyed; 5, when two nodes of roots have been completely destroyed; and 
6, when three or more nodes of roots have been destroyed. 
2. Due to seasonal constraints on labor and machinery, levels of 
a > 0.0004 resulted in idled acreage beyond that required for government 
program enrollment. Since cropland is typically fully utilized in the 
study area, solutions for higher levels of a were not considered. 
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